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The Inadequacy of a Proposed Paraconsistent Set Theory 
 
Abstract: We show that a paraconsistent set theory proposed in Weber (2010) is strong 
enough to provide a quite classical non-primitive notion of identity, so that the relation is an 
equivalence relation and also obeys full substitutivity: a=b(F(a)F(b)). With this as 
background it is shown that the proposed theory also proves x(xx). While not by itself 
showing that the proposed system is trivial in the sense of proving all statements, it is argued 
that this outcome makes the system inadequate. 
 
Weber (2010) proposes a paraconsistent set theory based upon a relevance logic 
with naïve abstraction. As the paper does not give a model for the proposed 
system, it must be assumed that the publication should be taken as posing a 
challenge to provide such a model, or else demonstrate that the system is trivial 
in the sense of proving all sentences. We do not show that the proposed system 
is trivial in the stated sense, but suggest that it is inadequate in the sense of 
proving theorems which one should not want as theorems even in a 
paraconsistent framework. 
The system’s primitive language has the connectives , ,  , the identity sign, 
 for membership and the universal quantifier . We will in our exposition use 
 for Weber’s form of identity, as we will show that a more appropriate notion 
of identity is supported in the suggested framework. Disjunction is introduced à 
la de Morgan, and the existential quantifier  as expected. AB is for 
(AB)(BA). It is of importance that the arrow is not for material implication, 
but for some sort of relevant implication. The axiom schemas are as follows: 
I AA 
IIa ABA 
IIb ABB 
III A(BC)(AB)(AC) 
IV (AB)(BC)(AC) 
V (AB)(AC)(ABC) 
VI (AB)(BA) 
VII AA 
VIII (AB)(AB) 
IXa (AB)((BC)(AC)) 
IXb (AB)((CA)(CB)) 
X xAA(y/x) 
XI x(AB)(AxB) 
XII x(AB)(AxB) 
 
The usual precautions are taken that in X, y is free for x in A, and that x is not 
free in A for axioms XI and XII. 
Five rules and a so-called meta-rule are presupposed: 
R1 A, BAB 
R2 A,ABB 
R3 AB,CD(BC)(AD) 
R4 AxA 
R5 xyA(x)A(y) 
 
MR If AB then ACBC 
 
In addition to this, one has a naïve comprehension schema and extensionality: 
 
Abstraction  x(x{y:A(y)}A(x)) 
 
Extensionality z(zxzy)xy 
 
The author shows that  is an equivalence relation, relying upon features of the 
arrow. 
 
We first show that the proposed framework supports a more adequate and 
classical notion of identity. Define: 
 
 a=b=Dz(azbz) 
 
The identity relation so taken is obviously an equivalence relation, and is 
suggested with a lore back to Leibniz. The proposed system proves the full 
substitution schema: 
 
FS a=b(A(a)A(b)) 
 
To see this, notice that a=b(a{x:A(x)}b{x:A(x)})  follows from an instance of 
axiom X, while also invoking IIa or IIb and axiom IV. From naïve abstraction we 
have that A(a)a{x:A(x)} and b{x:A(x)}A(b), so by invoking rule R3 we have 
that (a{x:A(x)}b{x:A(x)})(A(a)A(b)). FS follows by invoking axiom IV. 
 
The identity sign needs not, as we have shown, be taken as primitive in a 
framework with naïve comprehension and such resources as in the system 
proposed.  
 
In FS, a and b may fail to occur in the formula A(a), so FS supports the schema 
a=a(pp) where p is any sentence. We investigate from this with the sentence 
rr, where r is Russell’s paradoxical set {x:xx}. In the proposed set up, rrrr 
is a theorem. By contraposing an instance of axiom VII we obtain the result that 
(rrrr) by using modus ponens, i.e. rule R2. By contraposing an instance of 
FS we have that (rrrr)aa. So aa by modus ponens. By generalization, 
rule R4, x(xx) is a theorem of the proposed system. 
 
If one understands the extensionality principle as stating that xyx=y, it is 
easy to show, in light of our result, that all power-sets are paradoxical in the 
sense that they have members which also fail to be members: Since xx is a 
theorem, it follows that y(yxyx), so x{u:ux]. But also, x{u:ux]. It 
here seems worthwhile to bring up in passing that Weber (2010) does not show 
that any of his invoked infinite sets or power sets are not paradoxical in the 
sense just defined. But we would need such assurances in order to think that 
the proposed system can serve as a foundational theory in the way suggested. 
 
It would not be reasonable to defend the proposed system by arguing that the 
identity relation we have isolated is not adequate. The notion of identity we 
have introduced wears its adequacy upon its sleeves, as it were. Instead, a 
proponent of the proposed system would be better served by somehow 
accepting as a mysterious outcome that all sets are self-identical while also 
self-different. The latter idea could in the framework e.g. be championed for on 
the ground that for any set a, a{x:rr} while also a{x:rr}, where, as above, r 
is Russell’s paradoxical set. It is difficult to see, however, that such an attitude 
would not run counter to the stated goal of providing a foundation for standard 
mathematics. It is also difficult to see that a thesis to the effect that all objects, 
or sets, are different from themselves can be squared with our intuitions, and it 
would seem extraordinarily difficult to sell. It is strongly suggested that a 
theory that can appropriately deal with paradoxes, while also avoiding such 
controversial consequences for identity statements as pointed out, would be 
very much to be preferred. 
 
Our note falls short of showing that the proposed set theory is trivial in the 
sense of proving all sentences. It shows, however, that the proposed system is 
strong enough to give an account of a quite classical notion of identity, and that 
it is inadequate because it has highly undesirable theorems concerning identity 
so understood.  
 
It is not our burden to show that the proposed set theory is trivial, but rather 
its proponents’ burden to show that it is not. Such a non-triviality proof for the 
system has not been forthcoming, and a model has not been provided. 
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